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1.   Introduction 
 
  According to conventional wisdom in economic growth theory, geography is 
irrelevant for  explaining  relative income levels of countries.  The accumulation of 
capital and knowledge is  deemed independent of prevailing natural conditions, but 
instead depends on sectoral allocations of production factors, factor returns, saving rates, 
time discount rates and, in recent literature, political institutions.  In neoclassical growth 
theory, history should not matter much either since well-functioning capital markets 
ensure that countries sooner or later converge to their steady-state levels regardless of 
initial conditions.  The argument made in this paper is that exogenous geography and 
initial biogeographic endowments – and the diverging historical paths that these give 
rise to  –  in fact  account for  a  significant part of the  highly  unequal distribution of 
productive income in the world.    Favorable  biogeographic initial conditions  – in 
particular the prevalence in prehistory of plants and animals suited to domestication – 
led in some parts of the world to an early transition to sedentary agriculture and the rise 
of “civilization”,  which  conferred on some societies  a development head start of 
thousands of years over less fortunate areas.  We argue in this paper that the impact of 
this head start can still be detected  in the contemporary international distribution of 
prosperity.  
  Many attempts to explain long run patterns of economic development have followed 
Malthusian analysis in focusing on the relationship between population growth and 
economic development.  Boserup (1981) argues that the transition from the primitive 
hunter-gatherer stage of development to sedentary agriculture based on domesticated 
plants and animals was a reaction to population pressures and climatic changes that 
made the hunter-gatherer lifestyle unfeasible.  Kremer (1993) models technological 
progress from one million B.C. to the present as being endogenously determined by 
population growth.  As support for this hypothesis, Kremer compares population size 
and the level of technology observed by 1500 A.D. in the Old World (Eurasia and 
Africa) with the situation in Australia and Tasmania.  He finds, as predicted, that 
population size was relatively greater and the level of technology more advanced in the 
Old World.  Population growth is also what drives historical development in the models 
of Goodfriend and McDermott (1995) and Galor and Weil (1998).     2
  Another  fundamental influence on historical economic development is the 
institutions that societies embrace.  Thanks to pioneering works such as North (1990) 
and Knack and Keefer (1995), we have significant new insights about how institutions 
can help create diverging paths of economic progress.  In a long run model of world 
development, Jones (1999a) follows Kremer (1993) in assuming a close relationship 
between population growth and technological advance.    However, per capita 
consumption is more or less unchanged over thousands of years until an institutional 
shock in the form of improved property rights propels economies toward the Industrial 
Revolution and the ensuing rise in living standards.  Institutions play an even greater 
role in Hall and Jones (1999), where the quality of “social infrastructures” is the primes 
mobile of international variations in productivity and incomes.   
  A problem with demographic and institutional explanations of long run economic 
development, however, is  that the  factors  underlying  population growth  and  the 
development of good institutions are not identified. Why did population growth and 
institutional advance occur in some parts of the world and not in others?  The models 
above have very little to say about this important question. Population and institutions 
are usually regarded as exogenously given.  The main contention of this paper is that the 
ultimate factors in historical economic development – shaping the broad contours of 
population growth, and  the capacity for  institutional development and technological 
change – are geography and biogeography. 
  The notion that geography broadly conceived matters for societal development is not 
new.  As early as the eighteenth century Montesquieu (1750) had advanced a theory 
featuring the political influence of climate.  But subsequently geographic explanations of 
development fell into disrepute.   Yet  when thinking about geography and economic 
development, two empirical regularities inevitably stand out:  First, the majority of poor 
countries in  today’s  world  are found in the tropical climate zone; near the equator.  
Second, peoples from Eurasia (above all from the Western part) developed superior 
technology and colonized and dominated lands on all other continents.  The first 
regularity has recently been observed by several authors (Sala-i-Martin, 1997; Bloom 
and Sachs, 1998; Hall and Jones, 1999).  Hall and Jones (1999) use a measure of 
absolute distance from the equator as an instrumental variable for social infrastructure.  
They show that distance from the equator not only has a significant positive effect on 
social infrastructure, but it also exhibits a significant positive effect on output per capita.    3
Hall and Jones interpret this relationship as having nothing to do with geography per se; 
by their thinking countries further from the equator just tend to have good institutions.   
  Landes (1998), Bloom and Sachs (1998) and Gallup et al. (1999) take a different 
standpoint.  Landes identifies at least three reasons why development has been relatively 
slow in the tropics:   Heat, water supply, and disease.  Severe heat typically reduces 
human working capacity.  Water supply is problematic since it tends to be either too 
scarce (as in the Sahara) or too abundant (as in Amazonia) for agriculture based on 
annual grasses.    The prevalence  of serious tropical diseases like malaria, 
schistosomiasis, and River Blindness, poses a major obstacle to the use of animals like 
horses and cattle, apart from its obvious detrimental effects on human health.  Bloom 
and Sachs (1998)  point out  that due to more hours of sunlight during the growing 
season, the photosynthetic potential for annual plants is actually greater in mid-latitude 
regions than in the tropics.  Bloom and Sachs (1998) and Gallup et al. (1999) also show 
that conditions for transport in Africa  and other poor regions  have remarkable 
disadvantages:  A relatively small coastline, few natural ports, the highest proportion of 
the population within landlocked states, and the absence of rivers navigable for ocean-
going vessels.  Kamarck (1976) further points to the often poor quality of the soil in the 
tropics.  Tropical soils contain little organic material.   
  A far more general biogeographic framework for explaining the dominance of the 
Western world  is presented in the remarkable study of  Diamond (1997).   Diamond 
argues that the enormous size of the Eurasian continent, its large Mediterranean zone in 
the western part and the East-West orientation of its major axis, meant that Eurasia was 
disproportionately endowed with plants suited to cultivation, animals suited to 
domestication, and natural corridors of transit and communication suited to the diffusion 
of innovations.  Because of these biogeographic advantages, the agricultural revolution 
occurred earlier in Eurasia than anywhere else.  The surplus that was generated by the 
superior agricultural mode of production made possible the establishment of a non-
producing class whose members were crucial for the rapid development of writing, 
science, cities, technology-based military prowess and states.  When the continents 
finally collided in the late fifteenth century, the crops, horses, knowledge, institutions, 
weapons, and animal-based germs that had evolved in Eurasia over thousands of years 
overwhelmed the indigenous communities of the Americas, Africa, and Australia.    4
  The model  presented in this paper builds upon Diamond’s sweeping study by 
proposing  fundamental links between  exogenous geography, initial  biogeography and 
subsequent economic development; links so powerful that their consequences may still 
be detected today in international variations in output and productivity.  Societies 
enjoying biogeographic environments with great productive potential were the first to 
experience an agricultural revolution making possible the development of a non-food 
producing sector of political  and administrative elites that  produced and  organized 
knowledge.  After the transition from hunting and gathering to sedentary agriculture, 
economies enter a path of endogenous technological progress and increased population 
growth.    Per capita output, however, does not start growing until the Industrial 
Revolution when the Malthusian link between rising output and population is broken.  
The central hypothesis we investigate quantitatively is that present levels of per capita 
income  still register the effects  of  exogenous geographic  conditions and initial 
biogeographic  endowments.  This hypothesis  receives  remarkably strong empirical 
support from data for a broad cross-section of countries.  
  The outline of the rest of this paper is as follows.  Section two reviews modern 
archeological evidence on the emergence of  horticulture and  and animal husbandry 
(“sedentary agriculture”).  Section three  develops  a stylized  theoretical framework 
showing how exogenous geographic conditions and initial biogeographic endowments 
affected  the timing of transitions  thousands of years ago  from hunter-gatherer to 
agricultural production,  thereby unleashing sustained  technological progress that 
eventually led to the Industrial Revolution.  Section four supplies empirical evidence on 
the model’s principal implications regarding the importance of  geography and 
biogeography to economic development.  Section five concludes by summarizing the 
theory and evidence featured in our research. 
 
2.    The Agricultural Revolution
1 
 
Around 11,000 B.C. humankind was on the verge of entering an era of yet to be 
surpassed economic development.  The retreat of the great glaciers that marked the end 
of the Pleistocene geological epoch and the beginning of the Holocene, brought a 
warmer and wetter climate and a reoccupation of the ecological vacuum that the ices had 
                                                   
1 Section two below relies, except where noted, on Diamond (1997) and Smith (1998).     5
left.  Modern Cro-Magnon humans – capable of marvelous cave paintings and equipped 
with standardized stone tools and sewn clothing – had by this time populated all the 
major continents on earth.  As noted by Diamond (1997, p 52)  “…an observer 
transported back to 11,000 B.C. could not have predicted on which continent human 
societies would develop most quickly, but could have made a strong case for any of the 
continents.”    Nevertheless, we know with hindsight that the paths to  sedentary 
agriculture would be radically different across continents.  
  It turned out that the transition from a hunter-gatherer lifestyle to sedentary 
agriculture, based on domesticated plants and animals, first occurred in the so called 
Fertile Crescent of the Near East, encompassing the  present-day countries Israel, 
Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Iraq.
2  By 8500 B.C. the first signs of domesticated barley, 
emmer, and einkorn wheat appear in the Jordan Valley and in the Southern Levant.  
Within the following thousand years agricultural development in the Fertile Crescent 
continued with the domestication of goats, sheep, pigs, and, somewhat later, cattle.  The 
new form of economic life created a rising population density, new demands on social 
organization, and a food surplus that could be used to feed a non-producing class of 
chiefs, priests, warriors, and bureaucrats.  About 4500 years after the initial steps toward 
agriculture, the first civilization with writing, science, religion, cities and states, emerged 
in the river valleys of Tigris and Euphrates.  The change from hunting and gathering to 
sedentary agriculture would forever alter human life and activate a radically new path of 
rapid development along which we are still traveling. 
  As Table 1 shows, the Near East was far from the only center of independent 
domestication of plants and animals.  China (or possibly Central Mexico) was the next 
area to develop an agricultural system that was dependent on rice and millet cultivation 
and domesticated pigs.  As for China, it is probable that the domestication of rice took 
place in the South along the Yangtze River, while millet was introduced in the North 
along the Yellow River.  The agricultural practices of Central Mexico did not spread 
south of the tropical rain forests.  Hunter-gatherers in the Andes independently created 
food production based on potato, manioc, and llamas.  New research has found that 
plants were domesticated also in Eastern United states around 2500 B.C., whereas the 
                                                   
2 Domestication of a species is defined as “…the human creation of a new plant or animal – one that is 
identifiably different from its wild ancestors and extant wild relatives…/and which/…has been changed 
so much that it has lost its ability to survive in the wild.”  (Smith, 1998, p 18-19).     6
most recent center of independently developed agriculture is Sub-Saharan Africa; 
around 4000 B.C.  There are, however, other possible candidates.  Claims are sometimes 
made that Ethiopia and New Guinea might have domesticated plants, while cattle might 
have been independently domesticated in India.  
 










1.  Near East  8500 B.C.   wheat, barley, pea  goats, sheep 
2.  China  7500 B.C.   rice, millet  pig 
3.  Central Mexico  3500 B.C.    
(8000 B.C.) 
corn, beans  turkey 
4.  South Central Andes  3500 B.C.  
(5800 B.C.) 
potato, manioc  llama, guinea pig 
5.  Eastern United States  2500 B.C. 
(3200 B.C.) 
sunflower  none 
6.  Sub-Saharan Africa  4000 B.C.  sorghum  none 
 
Notes: Dates refer to the first attested date of domestication of an animal or plant. All dates here and elsewhere in the 
text are calibrated radiocarbon dates. The dates of the three American regions are from Diamond (1997).  Due to 
uncertainty about these dates, Smith’s (1998) much earlier approximations are shown in parentheses.    The 
domesticated plants and animals in the right hand side columns are examples, rather than a complete listing, of 
domesticated species in the area.   
Source: Diamond (1997), p 100 and Smith (1998), p 13.   
 
  How, then, did the agricultural revolution occur?  What was it that prompted hunter-
gatherers to domesticate plants and animals?  These issues have been intensely debated 
for decades within the scientific community.  In  what is  probably the most 
comprehensive survey of modern research on the subject, Smith (1998) identifies a 
number of factors that the independent transitions to agriculture in the Levant, in the 
Southern Sahara and in the Eastern United States had in common.  First, in all three 
regions, the species brought under domestication were seed plants rather than root crops 
or animals.  Second, in all three regions, the wild ancestors of these domesticates appear 
to have been important food sources before their domestication.  Third, the people who 
domesticated these seed plants lived in relatively large, permanent communities   7
occupied throughout most, if not all, of the year.  Fourth, these societies were relatively 
affluent, having access to a broad spectrum of wild plants and animals in their diets, as 
well as to the resources of rich aquatic habitats.  Fifth, since these early agricultural 
settlements were located near lakes or rivers, they also had access to a reliable supply of 
groundwater.  Sixth, it appears that the agricultural communities were bounded in time 
and space by less secure environments.  Preceding the emergence of agriculture in all 
three regions were climatic changes that worsened the conditions for the hunter-gatherer 
way of living in the areas surrounding the richer environments near lakes and rivers.  
  It is important to stress, however, that the emergence of food production was far 
from a deliberate revolution in human lifestyle.  Diamond (1997) describes vividly how 
the first stands of domesticated wheat in the Fertile Crescent probably appeared near 
latrines, garbage heaps, forest paths and cooking-places where humans unintentionally 
had disseminated seeds from their favorite wild grasses, growing nearby.  More 
conscious experimentation was presumably then carried out in the fertile riverbank soils 
on the outskirts of the villages by people whose relative affluence gave them time for 
such risky activities.  Furthermore, by 11,000 B.C all the necessary technological 
prerequisites were in place in the Fertile Crescent for an  agricultural lifestyle; flint 
blades in wooden handles for cutting grass, baskets, mortars, and the techniques for 
roasting grains and storing food underground.  
  A key issue is whether the agricultural revolution took place out of necessity or 
because of opportunity.  In the language of the economics of innovation, was the 
emergence of agriculture a result of “demand-pull” or “supply-push”?  Advocates of the 
former view usually argue that an exogenous increase in population forced hunter-
gatherers to adopt a more efficient mode of production which did not necessarily 
increase average standards of living (Boserup, 1981).  Climatic changes at the end of the 
Pleistocene might also have reduced the availability of wild game, thereby making the 
domestication of animals more or less necessary.  Jacobs (1969) takes the opposite view.  
On the basis of archeological evidence from the ancient Anatolian city Catal Hüyük, 
Jacobs maintains that a prospering town population that specialized in obsidian trade 
developed first.  The accumulation of imported wild foods in the trading settlement at 
Catal Hüyük then spontaneously led to the emergence of agricultural practices.  This 
hypothesis is well in line with modern research which has de-emphasized the importance 
of exogenous, demand driven explanations.  Rather than being societies sorely in need   8
of a more efficient way of living, the first agriculturists appear to have belonged to 
relatively prosperous groups who possessed the technology, time, and energy to conduct 
experimental search for ways of reducing long-term risk.  Observing the immediate and 
impressive gains from such experiments, a transition then followed within a relatively 
short span of time.   
  Can the stunning success of the hunter-gatherers’ agricultural experiments in the 
Fertile Crescent be explained by their extraordinary capacity to exploit their 
environment – a capacity greater than, for instance, that of the last remaining hunter-
gatherers in New Guinea?  Diamond (1997) convincingly refutes this argument.  Having 
lived among hunter-gatherers in New Guinea, Diamond describes these native New 
Guineans as “walking encyclopedias” with detailed knowledge of every imaginable use 
that could be made of hundreds of plants and animals.  This profound knowledge of the 
natural environment, gained through thousands of years of observation, has also been 
recorded among other primitive peoples.  The notion that native New Guineans or 
Aboriginals perhaps might have “missed” some crops or animals that could have been 
successfully domesticated, therefore seems highly unlikely.  Furthermore, when for 
example cattle spread south of the Sahara, hunter-gatherers there quickly adopted a 
pastoral lifestyle.   When horses were introduced in North and South America, native 
Indians immediately developed great skills in using them.  Indeed, nothing seems to 
suggest that hunter-gatherers in some regions had greater inherent ability to domesticate 
plants and animals than hunter-gatherers in other areas.  
  A crucial element for the success of agricultural experiments is rather to have good 
material to work with.  With no suitable species naturally available for domestication, 
there can be no fruitful experimentation and no agriculture.  In a careful taxonomy of 
wild plants and animals suitable for domestication, Diamond (1997) demonstrates that 
the distribution of such species is indeed very uneven across continents.  Out of about 
200,000 wild plant species in the world, only a few thousand are edible, and just a few 
hundred have ever been domesticated.  In a compilation by Blumler (1992) of the 56 
heaviest-seeded wild grasses on earth – that is, the most obvious candidates for plant 
domestication – it is shown that as many as 33 grow naturally somewhere in the Western 
part of Eurasia, predominantly in the Mediterranean areas of the Near East. (See Table 
2.)   Six species are confined to Eastern Asia, whereas only two grow in Australia and 
South America.     9
  The pattern is roughly the same for  animals.  The animals most suited to 
domestication are big, terrestrial, herbivorous mammals.  Out of 148 species of such 
mammals weighing more than 45 kilos, only 14 have ever been domesticated.  The 
remaining 134 have all proven impossible to domesticate for various reasons; they are 
naturally too nasty, they have a tendency to panic, they do not breed in captivity, they 
have a maturation rate that is too slow, or they do not have the required dominance 
hierarchy in their social structure that humans can use to gain control.  Only 14 big 
mammals were not disqualified on the grounds above, and as many as 9 of these were 
found in the Near East, among them “the big four”:  The wild ancestors of goat, sheep, 
pig, and cattle.  Contrast this with South America’s single suitable species (the llama) 
and the total lack of suitable species in North and Central America, Australia, and Sub-
Saharan Africa.  The Sub-Saharan case is particularly sad because the region has as 
many as 51 of the 148 heaviest mammals on earth, but not a single one passed the 
audition for domestication.  
  Table 2 shows that Western Eurasia in particular, but also East Asia, had superior 
initial  biogeographic  conditions for agricultural experimentation.  Why was this the 
case?  The answer lies in the continent’s geography and climate.  First, Eurasia is by far 
the largest landmass on the planet and it is naturally endowed with the greatest variation 
of species.  Second, the early success of food production in the Fertile Crescent, and its 
rapid diffusion to Europe and North Africa, can largely be explained by its 
Mediterranean climate.  All the major crops cultivated in the Fertile Crescent were 
annual grasses.  As shown by Blumler (1992) and others, a Mediterranean climate with 
wet winters and dry summers is particularly favorable for annual grasses.  There are 
Mediterranean zones also in other parts of the world - in Chile, South Africa, Southern 
California, and Northern Australia – but none of these were nearly as big as the Eurasian 
zone.  Although wet tropical habitats typically show an enormous biological diversity, 
their lack of seasonal changes, the irregularity of water supply, the relatively poor 
quality of soils, and the prevalence of diseases and pests harmful to humans, animals and 
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East Asia  6  7 
Southeast Asia  6  2 
Sub-Saharan Africa  4  0 
North America  4  0 
Central America  5  0 
South America  2  1 
Australia  2  0 
Pacific Islands and Iceland  0  0 
 
a The division of Eurasia into three subcontinents is made since food production systems evolved independently and 
with very different features in the East and West with arid Central Asia as a barrier between them.  Early agriculture 
in the Near East spread to Europe and North Africa but not to Sub-Saharan Africa.  Diffusion also took place from 
China to Southeast Asia, but due to the tropical climate in Southeast Asia, a different set of species was used there.  
Because of the north-south axis, diffusion of plants and animals was limited between the Northern, Central, and 
Southern parts of America.   
b The numbers refer to the geographical distribution of the world’s 56 heaviest wild grasses (Blumler, 1992).  The 
figures do not add to 56 because some species are found in more than one continent.  
c The numbers refer to the geographical distribution of the world’s 14 domesticable herbivorous or omnivorous, 
terrestrial mammals weighing more than 45 kilos (Nowak, 1991; Diamond, 1997).   
Sources: Nowak (1991), Blumler (1992), and Diamond (1997).   
 
 
  A third important reason, emphasized by Diamond (1997), is the East-West 
orientation of Eurasia’s major axis.  An East-West axis orientation facilitates diffusion 
of plants and animals.  There are a number of reasons for this:  Along the same latitude, 
regions will typically have the same day length, the same seasonal variations, the same 
regimes of temperature and rainfall, and even the same diseases.  Imported domesticated 
species can easily adapt to such similar environments even though their wild ancestors 
live elsewhere.  All other continents have North-South as the main axis of orientation, 
and this hampered the diffusion of agricultural innovations.   
  A picture thus emerges of opportunity rather than need as being the prime causal 
factor that tipped development in favor of agriculture in certain areas.  The advantages   11
would soon become obvious; domesticated plants gave a reliable source of food with 
high nutritional value which could feed a much greater population per unit area than 
hunting-gathering.  Domesticated animals gave meat, milk, fertilization, wool, leather, 
and were subsequently used for transport, plowing, and warfare.  The close physical 
proximity of man and animal also eventually gave agriculturists a high resistance to 
animal related germs such as those causing smallpox, measles, and tuberculosis.  All 
these advantages gradually made organized food production the dominant way of living 
in all of Eurasia where expanding agricultural communities  swept away most of the 
remaining hunter-gatherers.  
  The path to civilization was now inevitable.  In densely populated towns and cities, a 
nonproducing class emerged which was able to dominate the rest of the population by 
gaining control of the agricultural surplus.    Among these classes of chiefs, priests, 
warriors, bureaucrats, and skilled craftsmen, an explosion of new knowledge occurred in 
astronomy, mathematics, geometry, construction, and social organization.  Writing, 
probably the most important innovation of all times, first appeared in Sumer around 
4000 B.C.  Great empires soon emerged; Akkad, Egypt, Assyria, Babylon, Persia, and 
the most advanced of them all, the Greek and Roman civilizations, which today still 
serve as the pillars of Western civilization.  Meanwhile, in less well-endowed areas like 
Sub-Saharan Africa and Australia  –  areas with hardly any domesticable species  – 
development was much slower.  Agriculture was eventually adopted in Sub-Saharan 
Africa through the expansion of the Bantu peoples, but when the Europeans finally 
arrived in Australia, they found an Aboriginal population that was still at the hunter-
gatherer stage of development.  Judging from the data in Table 2 and from the argument 
developed above, this was not at all surprising.  
 
3.    A Theoretical Framework 
 
  We now present a simple theoretical framework of economic development over the 
three major stages of history; the hunter-gatherer stage, the agricultural stage, and the 
industrial stage.  The aim is to provide a formal representation of the link between initial 
geographic and biogeographic conditions and the present level of economic well-being.  
In so doing, we will make use of four stylized facts that were derived in the previous 
section:  (1) Agriculture was first developed in relatively rich environments.  (2) There   12
were no differences across continents in hunter-gatherers’ inherent ability to exploit 
their natural environments.  (3) The agricultural revolution made possible the emergence 
of a class of chiefs, craftsmen, and bureaucrats that lived on the surplus from the food 
producing sector.    (4) The  introduction of a non-food  sector initiated a process of 
endogenous knowledge creation and an increase in population growth.  In addition to 
these four stylized facts, we introduce a fifth, derived from the empirical literature on 
long run growth:    (5) Standards of living  did not significantly increase until the 
Industrial Revolution (Maddison, 1982; Fogel, 1999; Johnson, 2000).  
 
3.1    Initial Biogeographic Endowments 
 
As discussed in the previous section, the date 11,000 B.C. appears to be a good 
starting point for an analysis of the transition from primitive to modern production.  All 
major continents had been populated and technologies for collecting, processing and 
storing food were widely known (Diamond, 1997).  Let us assume that by this time there 
are N variations of geographic conditions and biogeographic endowments in those parts 
of the world that were settled by human beings.  Such environments would include 
tropical rainforests, arctic tundra, lowland deserts, Mediterranean grasslands, and so on.  
For simplicity, we imagine that all environments are constant from this time forward.
3  
  Let us further assume that with each variation n={1,2,…N} in the natural conditions 
of early human life, there is associated a biogeographic productive potential Ãn, where 
Ãn is a positive real number.  This variable reflects the number of plants and animals 
suited to domestication under conditions n.  It is the maximum number of species that 
non-agriculturists in n could possibly domesticate for the production of food.  As shown 
above, only a very small fraction of all plants and animals are edible, even in those 
environments that have the greatest variety of species.    An even smaller fraction of 
species is domesticable.  Hence, Ãn might be thought of as an indicator of the quality of 
initial biogeography in n.   
                                                   
3 It is well known that environmental conditions have not been constant during the Holocene geological 
epoch. The tremendous increase in rainfall during the early Holocene, which for instance made possible 
permanent  hunter-gatherer presence in the Sahara and in the now arid parts of Israel,  eventually 
reached a peak and was followed by cooler and drier periods. Although such changing conditions 
surely affected  human life,  they did not change the  fundamental character of the environment  in 
relation to other regions; even if the Sahara temporarily had higher precipitation, it was still a tropical 
dry region in the north of the African continent which lacked suitable species for domestication.    13
  A crucial assumption in the model below is that the initial conditions for 
environment n, Ãn, are different from the initial conditions of all other environments, 
that is,   Ãn„Ãn+1 for all n={1,2,…N}.   This means that a ranking of the productive 
potentials is possible.    The  quality of  Ãn  in turn  is  exogenously determined by 
geographic conditions.    Climate is an important factor in this regard.    For  various 
reasons, the biogeographic productive potential of Mediterranean habitats is greater than 
that of, for instance, arctic regions.  In fact, as we pointed out in the previous section, the 
agricultural potential of the Mediterranean climate zone in Eurasia appears to be 
superior to all others.    The size of the continent also influences  Ãn, as  does the 
orientation of its major axis.   
 
3.2     The Hunter-Gatherer Economy 
 
There are three fundamental stages of economic development:  The hunter-gatherer 
economy, sedentary agriculture, and modern industrial production.
4  During the greater 
part of human history, hunting and gathering predominated.  In the beginning, all human 
beings across all environments were hunter-gatherers.  At some point in time ( ) 0,
A
n tT ˛   
–  where 0 is the starting point of our analysis at approximately 11,000 B.C. and T 
=13,000 is the present day – the n-th economy makes the switch to full scale agriculture.  
However, in between these two “pure” stages is a transition period  ( ) 0,
A
n t t˛  in which 
both hunting-gathering and primitive agriculture is practiced.   
  Output per capita in the pure hunter-gatherer stage is simply at a subsistence level  y  
that is invariant across environments and time during hundreds of thousands of years in 
the prehistoric time span  t˛(-¥,0).  By  t=0, the transition to sedentary agriculture 
begins. Inhabitants of  n have now attained a level of technology facilitating 
domestication of plants and animals for use as intermediate capital goods.   The 
production function describing a hunter-gatherer economy under natural conditions n 
during this transition period, is 
                                                   
4 Like Galor and Weil (1998), our model below has three fundamental stages, but they do not fully 
correspond to Galor and Weil’s Malthusian, post-Malthusian and Modern regimes.  The links between 
population and knowledge in our model have similarities to Kremer (1993).  See also Goodfriend and 
McDermott (1995) and Hansen and Prescott (1999) for models of the historical development from pre-
market to market economies and from Malthusian to Solowian growth, respectively.     14
 









t=d￿t=dt￿t ￿ . 
(1)
 
Output per capita at time  ( ) 0,
A
n t t˛  is  /
HH
nnn yYL =  where total output is  






= =d￿t ￿ , and where  ( ) n L t  is total population  which  for 
convenience is  equated to the size of the labor force.    A continuum  An˛(0,Ãn) of 
biogeographic production factors are used.
5  Note that An(t)<Ãn, which implies that the 
people in n at time t˛(0,tn) still have not been able to make use of all domesticable 
plants and animals.  Each production factor i is employed at a quantity  ( ) n xi .  For 
simplicity we will assume identical marginal productivities:   ( )
A
nn xix =  for all i.  Hence, 




= =t￿ ￿ , where  0<a<1  gives  the return to capital.    d
H>1  is an 
exogenous productivity parameter for early agriculture which is constant across all n.   
  In our long  run perspective, we assume that all physical production factors are 
nondurable so that  individual  budget constraints  at each time  are 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
HHA
nnnnn ycAxL t=t+tt .    What is produced can either be used for 
consumption or as next period’s capital.  For example, a domesticated mouflon sheep 
can either be killed and eaten immediately or be saved and used for milk, wool, fertilizer 
and breeding.  Since 
A
n x  is constant by (highly stylized) assumption, the only source of 
growth in the stock of intermediate capital goods is the domestication of new plants and 
animals, that is increases in An(t).
6 
  Over time we assume that  An(t) grows according to a stochastic process 
( ) n n n A f A A
~
/ = & .  Growth in productive knowledge is random because no resources are 
devoted to experimental research activities.  The discovery of production methods is 
                                                   
5 The function in (1) is a very simple variant of the well-known Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) product 
variety specification, used for instance by Romer (1990).  The specification implies that the capital 
goods are neither perfect complements, nor perfect substitutes, that there is no knowledge 
obsolescence, and that each good’s marginal productivity is independent of the use of other capital 
goods.  
6 As in the endogenous growth literature, we will occasionally refer to An as “technological knowledge” 
since it captures the extent to which the hunter-gatherer society has made productive use of its physical 
environment.   15
therefore to  a  large extent a matter of luck or pure chance. However, the expected 











 E(ƒ(Ãn)) = gÃn 
    (2) 
 
where ƒ´(Ãn) = g>0 is a parameter reflecting people’s propensity to learn from nature.  
Equation (2) implies that the greater the biogeographic productive potential of n, the 
greater its expected growth rate of productive knowledge.    Note also the central 
assumption that g is constant across all n.  In line with the stylized facts discussed above, 
this means that there are no differences between societies in their inherent ability to 
learn about and exploit their environments.  Differences in the growth of productive 
knowledge derive solely from differences in initial conditions  Ãn, that is, there are 
simply more useful things to learn from a richer environment.  
  It is often argued in a Malthusian manner that there is a link between the growth of 
productive knowledge and population.   There are at least three reasons for such an 
assumption.  First, more people means more potential innovators of nonrivalrous ideas.  
Second, during times of increasing population density, there will be an increasing 
demand for new technology to cope with population pressure.  Third, an increase in 
productive knowledge  creates  production  surpluses that  allow an increased level of 
population.  Kremer (1993) models the growth of knowledge as a function of population 
size on the grounds of the first argument.    Boserup (1981) claims that  population 
pressure is the main determinant of the switch to agricultural technology, in line with the 
second argument.  However, as was discussed above, modern archeological research, 
influenced by Smith (1998), has de-emphasized the importance of population pressure as 
a direct influence on the transition to agricultural production.  
  The fundamental assumption in our model is rather that knowledge growth before 
the appearance of  sedentary agriculture is opportunity-driven; it is a function of the 
productive potential of the environment.  We further believe that technological advance 
temporarily results in rising living standards, which in turn allow population increases.  
Seen over the whole transition period to full-scale agriculture, we will therefore have 
that  ( ) nnnn LLgAA = & &  where g’>0.  More specifically, we assume that the expected   16
rate of population growth is  ( ) ( ) nnnn EgAAAA =a && .    Increases in technological 
knowledge thus lead to a proportional increase in the growth rate of the population.
7    
  Since 
A
n x  is constant over time, the expected growth rate of output per capita during 
the transition period  ( ) 0,
A
n t t˛  is  ( ) ( ) /0
HH
nnnnnn EyyEAALL =-a= & & & .    In other 
words,  the effects of  technological progress are offset in a Malthusian manner by 
increases in population.  Thus, output per capita remains at subsistence level  y .   
  The variance of the growth rate is likely to be substantial, however, yielding famine 
and threats of extinction in some periods and relative prosperity in others.  If we make 
the simplifying assumption that in the long run  n n n A A A
~
/ g = & , then the solution to the 
differential equation for An is  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0exp nn AAA t=￿gt % .         (3) 
 
A(0), the number of domesticated plants and animals at the beginning of the transition 
period, is equal across all n and is here normalized to be A(0)=1.  
  The agricultural revolution occurs when An reaches a certain threshold value 
A A .  
This threshold value reflects the minimum number of domesticated species that have to 
be in place for the great revolution to occur.
8  Like g, we assume that 
A A  is identical 
everywhere.  Sedentary agriculture with domesticated plants and animals demands at 
least one heavy, herbivorous mammal and two to three domesticated staple crops.  The 
composition of these domesticates can vary.  In the Fertile Crescent, the food production 
package included sheep, goats, pigs, cattle, emmer wheat, einkorn wheat, and barley, 
while in East Asia it included rice, foxtail millet, soybean, pigs, water buffalo, and 
chickens  (Diamond, 1997; Smith, 1998). 
  One tragic reality of nature is that in some environments, 
A
n AA < % .  An indigenous 
population could never introduce agriculture in such areas.
9  When development has 
                                                   
7 This assumption follows Kremer (1993). 
8 See Azariadis and Drazen (1990) for a model of threshold levels in economic development.  
9 The nonrival factor An is indexed because knowledge is nonrival only within n.  There is no idea 
diffusion between environments or continents in the hunter-gatherer stage.  As will be shown below, 
we do allow for knowledge diffusion between environments in the agricultural era.     17
reached the stage
A
nn AAA =< % , then  ( ) /0 nn EAA = & .  Without external shocks, such as 
colonization by people from richer environments, such societies are doomed to 
technological stagnation.  For instance, aboriginal Australians never passed the hunter-
gatherer stage and the nearby Tasmanians even lost their once acquired ability to make 
stone tools.  A persuasive body of evidence suggests that the reason for this failure was 
the lack of suitable species for domestication (Diamond, 1997) and hence an inadequate 
quality of initial conditions.  
  Let us assume that society n with 
A
n AA > %  attains the threshold level
A
n AA =  at time 
A
n t .    From (3) we then have that  ( ) ( ) exp
AAA
nnnn AtAAt ==g% .   Taking logs and 
rearranging, we obtain an explicit expression for 
A












g %%  
   (4)
 
  In (4) k is a positive constant that is identical across environments;  A
n t  thus depends 
only on Ãn.  To make things even clearer, let 
A
n Tt -  = T-k/Ãn be the number of years 
from the present;  then  ( ) ( )
2 -//0
A
nnn TtÃÃ ¶¶=k>  and 
( ) ( )
2 3 2 -/-2/0
A
nnn TtÃÃ ¶¶=k< .  The number of years since the adoption of sedentary 
agriculture in environment n is thus a positive concave function of Ãn, implying that the 
greater the productive potential of n afforded by biogeographic endowments, the earlier 
the transition  out of hunter-gatherer production.    This is a central prediction of the 
model.    The concavity in 
A
n Tt -  further suggests that the positive impact of initial 
biogeographic conditions on years elapsed since the transition to agriculture should be 
decreasing with Ãn.  These implications are investigated empirically in section four.   
 
3.3   The Agricultural Economy 
 
  The greater efficiency of agricultural food production had major implications for the 
n-th economy.  It allowed resources to be transferred to a separate knowledge producing   18
sector, which in turn led to an increase in the growth rate of new knowledge. Although 
this process initially created surpluses and rising living standards, Malthusian forces 
soon led to a proportional increase in population  which neutralized technological 
advance and kept per capita income levels at subsistence level.
10  A more predictable 
supply of food with a higher nutritional value, in combination with the reduced need of 
continual migration, also contributed to increased fertility and reduced mortality.  
  The establishment of a non-food sector in settled communities, whose members 
lived on the agricultural surplus, was nonetheless one of the most fundamental societal 
changes in human history.  In this sector were the kings, the warriors, the bureaucrats, 
the priests, and the specialized craftsmen.  Their activities (“output”) were a prerequisite 
for the gradual evolution of civilization.
11  These elites coordinated labor and allocated 
resources.  In so doing they also invented written language, mathematics, science, law 
and institutions for social control and governance.  New knowledge was created more 
systematically.  Old knowledge began to be recorded and codified.  Specialists, for 
instance in heavy grasses, could develop a deeper understanding of their object of study 
by carrying out natural experiments and analyzing carefully the results over time.  The 
reduction of risk in food production must also have had important consequences for 
people’s way of thinking about their place in nature and about what it was possible for 
their community to achieve.  The first states based on these developments were formed 
around 4000 B.C. in the river valley economies of Tigris and Euphrates.
12 
  The production function for the food and capital producing sector is shown in (5).  
Output per capita at time 
A
n t t>  is a function of the quantity of each intermediate capital 
good 
A
n x , of the range of intermediate capital goods (or knowledge) An,, and of the labor 
engaged in  the food and capital sector 
A
nn vL .
13      1
AH d>d>   is an exogenous 
                                                   
10 The archeological record suggests that standards of living were roughly the same in early agricultural 
societies and in hunter-gatherer communities; see, for example, the monograph of Boserup (1981) and 
the review of Johnson (2000).   
11 One might of course argue that the emergence of specialized elites and ruling classes was a mixed 
blessing.  The agricultural revolution inevitably led to social stratification and the invention of slavery, 
and it made possible centralized tyrannical rule.  
12 Landes (1998) argues that the Jewish-Christian tradition of nature’s subordination to man explains 
the rise of norms among Western peoples that promoted efficient exploitation of natural resources and 
related impulses to economic progress.  It appears to be no coincidence that this tradition had its roots 
in the Fertile Crescent. 
13 Y=f(A,x,vL).  Dividing this function for total output by L yields (5).   19
productivity parameter, reflecting the higher productivity in the full scale agricultural 
economy.   
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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t=dt=dtt ￿  
   (5)
 
  The range of capital goods An(t) now exceeds the threshold level 
A A .  However, it 
might also be the case that An(t) > Ãn.  The establishment of a nonproducing sector made 
it possible for the people in n to learn about and create capital goods beyond the limit set 
by n’s initial environmental conditions.  Apart from sheep, cows and wheat, the farming 
communities now invest in town walls, irrigation systems, and public storehouses.  In a 
hunter-gatherer society, such capital goods are useless, but in a  relatively  densely 
populated farming community, inventions like these are vital.  Embodied in each of such 
capital goods is a human idea or piece of knowledge.  An might thus be seen as reflecting 
the general state of technological knowledge in society. 
  xn
A  is the constant quantity of the  An(t) nondurable physical goods used in 
production.  The economy’s budget constraint is still  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
AA
nnnnn ycAxL t=t+tt  
and as before progress in our model takes place through the discovery of new capital 
goods that can be used in production.    The fraction of  labor engaged in the food 
producing sector,  (0,1)
A
n v ˛ , is treated as exogenously determined.  
  A separate non-food sector is made possible by the surplus that the transition to full 
scale agriculture creates.  The fraction of the labor force active in this sector,  ( ) 1
A
n v - , 
comprises a small societal elite of chiefs, bureaucrats, scientists, and specialized 
craftsmen.  Being in control of the agricultural surplus, this elite controls the masses of 
small scale farmers.
14  Whereas  1
A
n v =  would be the optimal solution in a short-sighted, 
egalitarian hunter-gatherer society where survival is the primary aim, the social planners 
in the ruling elite of town-based agriculturists now have longer planning horizons and 
realize that investments in  a knowledge producing sector are necessary in order to 
increase technological knowledge beyond  the limits set by the environment.  
                                                   
14 It is well known that  the societies of  early civilizations were strictly hierarchical. In Sumer, for 
instance, a class of priests kept the majority of the population in near slavery. Even in Athens, where a 
kind of democracy was introduced, the vast majority of the population was made up of slaves.     20
Improvements in technology also increase population,  which increases the military 
power and prestige of the incumbent ruler.  During the greater part of history, however, 
(1)
A
n v -  has been close to 0.  
  The outputs of the non-food sector are viewed here as innovations, or increases in 
the existing stock of knowledge.    Although  strictly speaking  these innovations  are 
defined in our model as introductions of new capital goods, we recognize the close link 
between this kind of technological knowledge and the state of societal knowledge in 
general.   It was within the non-food sector that the great advances in mathematics, 
science, engineering and socio-political organization were made in the early 
civilizations.  Writing was invented as a bureaucratic device for keeping track of taxes 
and tributes.    Chiefs and their advisors designed more efficient ways of social 
organization in order to monitor the complex, densely populated city-states that began to 
emerge.    To stay in power they also had to develop political skills and military 
technologies.  To legitimize their rule, chiefs needed to create convincing webs of myths 
and religion.  By the construction of ever more imposing monuments, the incumbent 
rulers would demonstrate the superiority of their own city, dynasty, or empire.  The 
development of science, technology, politics, and institutions was thus to a great extent a 
necessary response of ruling elites to the new demands of a sedentary lifestyle and to 
competitive threats from other agricultural societies.  
  Knowledge growth is described by the following function: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1
A
nnnn AAvD Øø t=t-+ ºß
&   (6)
 
The rate of knowledge growth is therefore  ( ) 1
A
nn vD -+  > 0.  Since  An(t) is a 
nonrivalrous production factor, it can be used both in the regular sector and for the 
creation of new knowledge.  Growth of knowledge in n has two sources; endogenous 
creation  in  n and diffusion from other environments.    Endogenous knowledge 
production is captured by the first term inside the parenthesis, where  ( ) 1
A
n v -  is the 
share of the labor force in the non-food sector.  The growth rate of knowledge thus   21
increases linearly with ( ) 1
A
n v - , but there is no “scale effect” in (6) since the growth rate 
does not increase with the level of the population.
15  
  Dn is the diffusion of knowledge from other continents.
16  Such diffusion could 
arguably be modeled as a function of several factors; for instance geography and the 
knowledge gap between n and the rest of the world (Olsson, 1999).  It might also be 
modeled as a function of time.  During the greater part of history, intercontinental 
diffusion has been nonexistent or very insignificant.  Until around 1500 A.D., human 
societies in Eurasia, North and South America, Africa, and Australia followed 
completely separate knowledge trajectories.  When advances in ship technology made it 
possible for European vessels to cross the big oceans, ideas finally began to diffuse 
between continents, which to some extent offset the initial advantages enjoyed by the 
richer environments.   Yet  although the speed and strength of knowledge diffusion 
probably has increased over time, important geographical differences in knowledge 
stocks still persist.
17 
  The previously assumed Malthusian link between technological advance and 
population growth is still in place so that  ( ) ( ) /1
A
nnnnnn LLAAvD =a=-+a & & .  It also 
follows from (5)-(6) that  steady state output growth in the agricultural economy is 
/0 nnnnnn yyAALL =-a= & & & .    Despite  significant progress in technological 
knowledge, standards of living remain at subsistence level.
18   
 
 
3.4    The Industrial Economy 
 
  The third fundamental stage in economic history is the modern industrial economy.  
This stage is generally regarded to have been initiated in the Western world by the end 
of the eighteenth century.  Numerous researchers have extensively analyzed the era
19 
and a full treatment is beyond the scope of this paper.  Here, we will only briefly sketch 
                                                   
15 See Jones (1999b) for an overview of the debate on scale effects in modern growth theory.   
16 Dn might also be thought of as the exogenous component of knowledge growth in general. 
17 For more elaborate treatments of this argument and of knowledge diffusion in general, see Jaffe et al 
(1993), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1999), and Olsson (1999).   
18 See Maddison (1982),  DeLong (1998),  Fogel (1999), or Johnson (2000) for long run empirical 
estimates that support this feature of the model. 
19 See for instance Mokyr (1990).    22
what by our understanding are the main lines of development:  An increased rate of 
endogenous technological progress,  the collapse of the Malthusian link between 
technology (or output) and population, and a rapid rise in living standards. 
  In our highly simplified framework, the Industrial Revolution occurs when  the 
technology variable attains the industrial threshold level 
IR A .  This happens at time 
IR
n t , 
so that  ( )
IRIR
n AAt = .   In eighteenth century Britain, the final pieces of technological 
knowledge, which were in place before the threshold level was reached and development 
took off, included  the  insights in atmospheric pressure inherent in the first primitive 
steam engines of Newcomen and Watt, the principles behind Hargreaves’ early spinning 
jenny and  Crompton’s mule,  and a  number of new precision tools  such as planing 
machines and lathes which would be crucial for standardized production (Mokyr, 1990). 
  Output per capita in the industrial era is given by the production function 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
1 IRIRIRIR
nnnnn yAxvL
a-a -a t=dtt .      (7) 
 
Equation (7) is meant to describe both agricultural and industrial production.  This new 
structure of production differs from agricultural production in (5) in several respects:  
Productivity is higher (
IRA d>d ), a capital deepening has taken place (
IRA
nn xx > ), and the 
intermediate capital goods in the range  ( ) 0
IR
nn AA t->  are very different in nature from 
those in the agricultural era.  Another important change is that a larger fraction of the 
labor force is now active in the sector that does not produce physical goods (
IRA
nn vv < ).  
An “R&D” sector is gradually  coming into place which together with a growing 
education sector  make up the knowledge producers in the economy.    The function 
describing their creation process is shown in (8).     
 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1
IR
nnnn AAvD Øø t=t-+ ºß
&   (8)
 
The partly endogenous, partly exogenous knowledge formation from the agricultural era 
is thus continued, with the important difference that ( ) ( ) 11
IRA
nn vv ->- .    23
  Apart from the change in levels of certain parameters, the fundamental difference 
between the agricultural and the industrial eras concerns the Malthusian link between 
technological advancement and population growth.  After the Industrial Revolution the 
link disappears;  0 nn n LL =h‡ &  where hn is independent of  nn AA &  and assumed to be 
constant over all n.
20  The reason for this empirical regularity has been widely discussed.  
Galor and Weil (1998) argue that improved technology increased the returns to human 
capital, which made parents switch from child “quantity” to child “quality”.  We believe 
this  may  be an important reason, although we do not  explicitly model it.    The 
implication of the termination of the Malthusian link is that  /
IRIR
nnnnnn yyAALL =-a & & &  
10
IR
nnn vD =-+-ah> .    Thus, the growth rate of technology finally dominates the 
growth rate of population, which results in rapidly rising living standards.   
 
 
3.5    Comparative Statics 
 
  The solution to the differential equation in (6)  yields the level of productive 
knowledge at the time of the Industrial Revolution, that is at time 
IR
n t t= , as    
 
( ) ( )( ) exp1
IRIRAAIRA
nnnnnn AtAAvDtt Øø ”=￿-+- ºß .      (9) 
 
Equation (9) can in turn be rewritten into an expression for the time of the Industrial 

















                                                   
20 A more appropriate description than what we have suggested is perhaps that the Malthusian link was 
still strong during the initial phases of the Industrial Revolution, allowing rapid population growth 
(Fogel, 1999). We will not take this aspect into account in this model.     24
where the length of the agricultural era 
IRA
nnn tt q=-  is an environment-specific constant. 
The important insight from this result is that, all else equal, the later the transition to 
agricultural production, the later the transition to an industrial economy.   
  Next, since we have already established that income per capita did not start growing 
until the start of the Industrial Revolution, we can express the present  level of log 
income at  T t=  as  
 















where the first part of the exponential expression is the output per capita growth rate 
during the industrial era.  Simple comparative statics of the second line of (10a), where 
we have substituted in 
A
nn t q+   for 
IR
n t , gives  the intuitive result that  
( ) ln10
IRAIR
nnnnn ytvD ¶¶=--+-ah< .    Hence the later  was  the transition to 
sedentary agriculture (and, therefore, the  later  was the onset of sustained knowledge 
growth), the lower is the present level of income per person.  Log income per capita 
increases with time T, with knowledge diffusion Dn, and with the allocation of labor in 
the knowledge sector, ( ) 1
IR
n v - .  The population growth rate hn has a negative effect on 
output per capita.  
  The dependence of current income on  exogenous  geography and  initial 
biogeography, however, are the relations we want to emphasize.  We know from earlier 
results  that  ( ) ( ) exp
AA
nnnn AtAt =g%  and that  ln//
A
nAnn tAAA =g=k %%  (Eq. 4).  Writing 
output per capita as a function of  n A %  instead of 
A
n t  yields 
 








Łł % . 
(10b) 
 
  With (10b) we establish a link between the present level of log income per capita 
and biogeographic endowments before the agricultural revolution.  The key variables in   25
this regard are of course represented by Ãn.  Differentiation of  ( ) ln 
IR
n yT  with respect to 
Ãn yields  ( )
2 ln10
IRIR
nnnnnn yAvDA ¶¶=-+-ah￿k> %% , that is, log output per capita 
increases with the initial productive potential of environment n.  As pointed out before, a 
large Ãn implies a small 
A
n t , which in turn implies a small 
IR
n t ; in other words early 
transitions to agricultural  and industrial production  and a  long period of positive, 
endogenous growth.  Regions with a  well endowed  natural environment, which 
consequently  made the transitions to  agriculture  and industry  comparatively  early 
should,  other things equal, therefore have higher income per capita today than more 
poorly endowed regions where the transitions came later.  This central proposition of the 
model is evaluated empirically in the next section.  Note that the second derivative of 
( ) ln 
IR
n yT  with respect to Ãn in (10b) is negative, implying that the positive relationship 
between  ( ) ln 
IR
n yT  and Ãn. is concave.  
 
 
4.    Some Empirical Evidence 
 
  The  principal prediction of the  theoretical exercises  in section  three is that the 
contemporary level of economic development should be positively related  to initial 
biogeographic  endowments, that is,  to biogeographies favoring an early transition to 
agriculture.   Calibration of  initial conditions, Ãn, is necessarily imprecise.  However, 
there are a number of plausible proxies.  In line with Diamond (1997) and the reasoning 
above, we  obtain measurements of five key geographic and biogeographic variables: 
size of continent, major axis of continent, climate (calibrated in two ways), and the 
number of animal and plant candidates for domestication.   
  The sequence of relationships is depicted in Figure 1.  All else equal, the larger the 
size of a continent or landmass, the greater the biodiversity and the greater the number 
of species suitable for domestication.  The greater the East-West orientation of the major 
axis, the easier was the diffusion of agricultural innovations between areas.  A temperate 
climate, and in particular the Mediterranean subtype, favors annual grasses like wheat 
and barley.  Geography (inclusive of climate) affects the number of plant and animal 
species suited to domestication, which in turn determined the timing of the agricultural   26
revolution and the subsequent evolution of endogenously created knowledge, the 
formation of modern sociopolitical institutions and the onset of sustained growth.   
  Yet even after the transition to agriculture, it seems likely that the size, axis, and 
climate of continents continued to exert influence on development.
21  Greater continental 
size meant greater population and fiercer competition between societies.  An East-West 
orientation of the landmass continued to facilitate the diffusion of knowledge since 
transmitters of innovations had to pass through fewer rain forests or deserts.    A 
temperate climate still meant fewer diseases harmful to humans and livestock, rainfall 
patterns and  soil qualities  favoring  stable growth of  nutritious plants,  as well as 
temperatures favoring hard manual work. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Biogeography and Long-Run Economic Development 
                                                   
21 The observant reader will note that such a direct influence is not explicitly modeled in the theoretical 
section.   
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4.1    Samples and Measurement
22 
 
  Table 3 reports descriptive statistics  on variables appearing in the regressions 
reported ahead.  We obtained measurement of pertinent variables for the largest possible 
samples, but excluded (i) countries whose current income per capita is based primarily 
on extractive wealth (mainly oil production based initially on foreign technology and 
skilled labor), and (ii) “neo European” countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and 
the US) where the food and technology package was transferred by European colonizers 
hundreds of years ago, rather than having developed indigenously.  Countries with these 
characteristics are omitted because our model and principal hypothesis are not germane 
to the sources of their present prosperity.  
  The metrics of  some of  our variables have no natural  or intuitive  interpretation.  
Hence to facilitate assessments of relative effects we convert all variables, except output 
per capita, to ‘standard’ form, which yields variates with mean zero and unit variance.
23  
Exogenous geographic conditions are measured by four variables:  Climate is based on 
Köppen´s system of climatic classification.  It takes four discrete values; with 3 denoting 
the best climate for agriculture (Mediterranean and West Coast climates) and 0 denoting 
the worst (tropical dry).  Latitude is the distance from the equator in absolute latitude 
degrees.  It captures well known climatic effects not picked up by the somewhat crude 
Köppen classification; low latitudes are associated with poor soil quality, highly variable 
rainfall and a high incidence of debilitating tropical disease.  Axis is a measure of the 
east-west orientation of the major landmasses and  is  calibrated with degrees of 
longitude.  As pointed out earlier, it measures barriers to the transmission of goods, 
people and ideas.  Size is the number of square kilometers of the landmass to which each 
country belongs.    As indicated in Table 4, the measures of geography  (and 
biogeography)  exhibit fairly high correlations. (Multicollinearity is of course  more 
pronounced than  the magnitudes of  shared variance  implied by  the bivariate 
                                                   
22 Sources of all variables, and definitions more precise than what appear below, are given in the Data 
Appendix. 
23 In standard form  (or “z form”) a variate X is transformed( ) ˆx XX s - .  Standardization of the 
regressors of course  affects only the scale of  slope  coefficient estimates facilitating, as noted, 
comparisons of relative magnitudes (responses of  a regressand to standard deviation changes in 
regressors).   28
correlations.)  Hence we compute Geo Conditions – the first principal component of the 
four geographic variables just described. 
  Initial  biogeographic endowments are measured by two variables:    Plants  is the 
number of annual or perennial wild grasses with a mean kernel weight exceeding 10 
milligrams known to exist in prehistory in various parts of the world.  Animals is the 
number of domesticable mammals weighing more than 45 kilograms known to exist in 
prehistory in various parts of the world.  (See Table 2)  Bio Conditions is the first 
principal component of these variables. 
  Political Environment and  Social Infrastructure are  “institutional” variables that 
geography and biogeography are conditioned on in some of the log output per capita 
regression experiments.  The former is the average of Knack and Keefer’s (1995) coding 
over 1986-95 of five political-institutional characteristics of each country:  (i) quality of 
bureaucracy, (ii) rule of law, (iii) government corruption, (iv) risk of expropriation and 
(v) risk of government repudiation of contracts.  The later variable was developed by 
Hall and Jones (1999)  to quantify the wedge between social and private returns to 
productive activity;  it is the average of Knack and Keefer’s political codings and Sachs 
and Warner’s (1995) index of the openness of each country to free trade during 1950 to 
1994.  Finally, 1997 GDP per capita is expressed in constant US dollars at base year 
1985 international prices.   29
 
Table 3.   Statistics 
Variable  N Obs  Mean  Std Dev  Minimum  Maximum 
           
Climate 
 
112  0  1.0  -1.52  1.45 
Latitude 
 
112  0  1.0  -1.43  2.32 
Axis 
 
112  0  1.0  -1.48  2.22 
Size 
 
112  0  1.0  -1.77  1.04 
Geo Conditions  
 
112  0  1.0  -1.28  1.89 
Plants 
 
112  0  1.0  -0.95  1.53 
Animals 
 
112  0  1.0  -0.91  1.28 
Bio Conditions  
 
112  0  1.0  -0.97  1.39 
Political Environment 
 
102  0  1.0  -1.93  2.05 
Social Infrastructure 
 
100  0  1.0  -1.45  2.15 
1997 GDP 
 per capita  
 
112  4850  5291  369  21974 
log 1997 GDP 
per capita 
 
112  7.9  1.1  5.9  10.0 
 
Notes:  Except for the GDP terms, all variables are in standard form with mean zero and unit variance.  Geo 
Conditions is the first principal component of Climate, Latitude, Axis and Size.  Bio Conditions is the first principal 
component of Plants and Animals.  The Data Appendix gives detailed definitions and sources of all variables. 
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Table 4.   Correlations 
Variable  1 
 
2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
1  Geo Conditions 
 
1.0                   
2  Climate 
 
.80  1.0                 
3  Latitude 
 
.84  .74  1.0               
4  Axis 
 
.84  .48  .53  1.0             
5  Size 
 
.69  .30  .33  .67  1.0           
6  Bio Conditions 
 
.88  .82  .78  .68  .50  1.0         
7  Plants 
 
.84  .81  .77  .60  .48  .96  1.0       
8  Animals 
 
.86  .77  .74  .72  .49  .96  .86  1.0     
9  Political Environment 
 
.68  .61  .73  .49  .26  .62  .57  .63  1.0   
10  Social Infrastructure  .59  .52  .60  .49  .18  .56  .48  .60  .87  1.0 
 
Notes:  Geo Conditions is the first principal component of Climate, Latitude, Axis and Size.  Bio Conditions is the 
first principal component of Plants and Animals.  All variables are in standard form with mean zero and unit variance; 
therefore correlations between a principal component and the variables used to generate it are identical to the 




  4.2    Regressions 
 
  Tables 5 and 6 report evidence from regressions.  The regression setups are far from 
perfect representations of the equations presented in section three, which themselves are 
merely  stylized  mechanisms  designed  to aid  thinking about  the  connections of 
geography and biogeography  to  contemporary levels of economic  development.  
Regressions 1 to 4 in Table 5 pertain to the first link of the long-run causal scheme 
featured in our  historical analysis and illustrated  by Figure 1.    These regression 
experiments show that exogenous geographic conditions explain around 80 percent of   31
the variance  of  the  international distribution of  heavy seeded  plants and  large 
domesticable animals that are known to have existed in prehistory.
24 
  Regression 5 pertains to the second link in the long-run causal chain:  The influence 
of  initial  biogeographic endowments  on  the  timing of the transition to  sedentary 
agriculture, which we regard as one of the most important events in the thousands of 
years of  humankind’s economic development.    The  transition  dates are based on 
calibrated radiocarbon dating of the first domestication of any plant or animal, with the 
first  transition  occurring approximately 10,500 years ago (8,500  B.C.  in  Western 
Eurasia) and the most recent around 4,500 years ago (2,500 B.C. in North America).
25,26  
Such information is available for 8 regions of the world.  This limited body of data 
nonetheless  supports the thesis that the richer  was  a region’s  initial  biogeographic 
endowment, the earlier  was  the transition  out of hunter-gatherer production  to 
agriculture.  The composite Bio Conditions variable explains 67 percent of the variance 
in calibrations of  the number of years since the  transition to agricultural production 
( )
A
n Tt - , and it shows some sign of the concavity implied by equation (4).  
  Table 6 reports regressions for log 1997 GDP per capita, the end-point of the long 
causal sequence depicted in Figure 1.  International variation in contemporary per capita 
incomes is truly staggering.  Across the 112 countries in our sample, 1997 GDP per 
capita expressed in 1985 US dollars ranges from 369 (Ethiopia) to 21974 (Luxembourg), 
a  nearly  sixty-fold difference.    The first three regression experiments  indicate  that 
geography and biogeography are able to account for between 40 and 50 percent of the 
variance in 1997 log incomes per capita.  Our crude measurement of biogeographic 
endowments fits almost 40 percent of the international variation all by itself, and reveals 
some signs of the concave  effects implied by  Equation  (10b) (the quadratic  Bio 
Conditions term in Regressions 2 and 3).  In view of the fact that we have only seven 
                                                   
24  As indicated by Table 2, note that Plants, Animals and Bio Conditions do not take N=112 
independent variations.  The composite Bio Conditions variable takes just 7 variations over the N=112 
countries. 
25 See Diamond (1997) and Smith (1998).    The 8 regions include the six independent origins of 
agriculture in Table 1, plus Australia and the Pacific where agriculture was never independently 
developed.  
26 It should be noted that the first attested dates of domestication used in the regression, do not fully 
correspond to the transition dates to full scale agriculture (
A
n t ) discussed in the theoretical section.  
However, the dates that we use in this section are undoubtedly closely connected in time to the true 
transition dates.  Archeological evidence suggests that once one animal or plant was domesticated, the 
others soon followed.    32
independent variations of prehistorical Bio Conditions (Plants and Animals) in the 112 
country sample (cf. Table 2), we take this to be a quite remarkable result.   
  Yet the evidence in regressions 1 to 4 in Table 6 should not be over interpreted.  For 
example, taken at face value the estimates for regression 3 imply that a change from the 
worst Bio and Geo Conditions to the best would yield a shift in 1997 GDP per capita 
from around 1000 dollars to around 8600 dollars.
27  Given measurement imprecision, 
exogenous geography and initial condition biogeography therefore are able to account 
for  at least  eight and one-half of the nearly sixty-fold difference in contemporary 
incomes per head which is observed in a broad international cross-section of countries.  
This corresponds to the development gaps between, for instance, Ghana, Nigeria  or 
Zimbabwe (where incomes are in the vicinity of 1000 dollars of income per head) and 
Greece, Malaysia or Portugal (where incomes lie in the interval 7,300 to 8,700 dollars 
per head).   
  The full range of international variation in incomes per person, however, runs from 
the 400 to 500 dollars per person typical of the poorest countries to the 15,000 to 20,000 
dollars per person  enjoyed by the richest.    Hence, a  complete  accounting  of 
contemporary variations  in economic prosperity  requires  explanatory  variables 
generating predictions that halve the per capita incomes implied by the worst geography 
and biogeography, and that double the per capita incomes implied by best.  The leading 
candidates are the political and institutional arrangements that constrain, and at times 
influence decisively, the effectiveness of economic activity. 
                                                   
27 These estimates are computed simply by applying the coefficients in regression 3, Table 6  (along 
with the omitted constant) to the range of variation (reported in Table 3) of Geo and Bio Conditions, 
and then finding the implied levels of GDP per capita from the predicted log values.   33
 
Table 5.   Regressions for Initial Bio Conditions, n A % , and Years Since Transition  
                to Sedentary Agriculture, (
A
n Tt - ) 














  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
           
Climate  0.50 
(7.2 | .00) 
0.42 
(6.1 | .00) 
0.47 
(7.8 | .00) 
   
           
Latitude  0.31 
(4.3 | .00) 
0.21 
(2.9 | 00) 
0.26 
(4.2 | 00) 
   
           
Axis  0.08 




(3.8 | .00) 
   
           
Size  0.17 




(2.0 | .05) 
   
           
Geo Conditions         0.83 
(19.8 | .00) 
 
           
Bio Conditions           6458 
(3.1 | .02) 
           
Bio Conditions 
Squared 
        -2281 
(-1.8 | .13) 
           
Adjusted 
R-Squared 
.77  .76  .81  .78  .67 
           
St. Error  0.48  0.49  0.42  0.46  2196 
           
N  112  112  112  112  8 (regions) 
 
Notes:  In parentheses are t-ratios | significance levels (p-values).  All variables are in standard form with mean zero 
and unit variance.  Geo Conditions is the first principal component of Climate, Latitude, Axis and Size.  Bio 
Conditions is the first principal component of Plants and Animals.  The Data Appendix gives detailed definitions and 
sources of all variables. 
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Table 6.  Regressions for 1997 log GDP per capita 
 
                              log GDP per capita 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
               
Climate  0.35 
(3.1 | .00)
           
               
Axis  0.17 
(1.8 | .07)
           
               
Latitude  0.40 
(3.4 | 00) 
           
               




  0.33 
(4.8 | .00) 
 
               
Bio Conditions     0.88 
(6.3 | .00) 
0.48 
(2.2 | .02)
  0.28 
(3.4 | .00)
  0.32 
(4.4 | .00) 
               
Bio Conditions 
Squared 




       
               
Political 
Environment 




   
               
Social 
Infrastructure 




               
Adjusted 
R-Squared 
.49  .38  .41  .69  .69  .77  .76 
               
St. Error  0.80  0.88  0.86  0.65  0.65  0.57  0.58 
               
N  112  112  112  102  102  100  100 
 
Notes:  In parentheses are t-ratios | significance levels (p-values).  Regression constants are omitted.  All regressors 
are in standard form with mean zero and unit variance.  Geo Conditions is the first principal component of Climate, 
Latitude, Axis and Size.  Bio Conditions is the first principal component of Plants and Animals.  The Data Appendix 
gives detailed definitions and sources of all variables. 
 
 
  In regressions 4 and 5 of Table 6 the Political Environment variable introduced 
earlier is added to equations including Geo Conditions and Bio Conditions.  Regressions 
6 and 7 are specified with the Social Infrastructure variable that was discussed earlier.  
Estimates for these models reinforce results reported in earlier papers by Acemoglu et al. 
(2000), Gallup et al. (1999), Hall and Jones (1999), Knack and Keefer (1995), Olson et 
al. (2000) and Rodrik (1997) which indicate that the quality of political-institutional 
arrangements has potent statistical influence on the levels and growth rates of output and   35
productivity recorded across countries.  Unlike equations specified with geography and 
biogeography alone, regressions 4 to 7 explain the lion’s share of cross-national variance 
in log output per capita, with 
2 ' Rs  running from .75 to .80.  More pragmatically, these 
models yield fits that come much closer to spanning the full dispersion of per capita 
incomes observed internationally.    Applying  the  estimates from regression 5, for 
instance, we calculate that the incomes per person associated with the worst and best 
combinations of Bio Conditions and Political Environment are around 600 dollars and 
13,700 dollars, respectively. 
  Political and institutional arrangements clearly have proximate, statistically powerful 
effect on economic  performance.    Yet regressions 4 to 7  show that  Bio and  Geo 
Conditions  retain significance and substantive importance in the presence of these 
variables.   Moreover, every one of our measures of geography is truly exogenous 
(unlike, for example, many of the geographic variables featured in the papers of Gallup 
et al. 1999 and Sachs and Warner, 1997).  And our measurements of initial condition, 
biogeography (Plants, Animals and their first principal component, Bio Conditions) are 
dated,  in most recent vintage, from approximately 4,500 years ago.   Although 
endogenous in our very long-run historical causal sequence (Figure 1), biogeography is 
indisputably exogenous with respect to current incomes.  Problems of joint endogeneity 
and reverse causation are therefore decisively ruled out in our theoretical setups and in 
our empirical assessments of the effects of geography and biogeography on present day 
leves of economic development. 
  The same is not true, however, of the political-institutional variables; among other 
reasons because rich countries have the resources to build institutions of high quality.
28  
Researchers have struggled with the joint  endogeneity issue,  proposing various 
instrumental variables to obtain consistent estimates of the proximate effects of politics 
and institutions on economic performance.  None of these attempts is entirely persuasive 
                                                   
28 The related idea that a relatively high level of economic development (and perhaps also distributions 
of wealth and income that are not too inequitable) are prerequistes for  democractic political 
development (conceived in terms of  competitive politics, the rule of law, security of property rights 
and individual liberties, and so forth) can be traced in the modern social science literature back at least 
to Lipset (1959), and before that back to the Aristotle and other ancient thinkers.  Lipset (1981, chapter 
14) comments on the more systematic quantitative demonstrations of the economic development to 
political democracy thesis  that were  undertaken in the 1960s and early 1970s by Cutright, Olsen, 
McCrone and Cnudde, Winham, Diamond, among other political sociologists and poltical scientists.  
Here, as in  other  lines of  recent  research on politics, institutions and economic growth and 
development, economists are beginning to replicate and extend the earlier work of political sociologists 
and political scientists.  A prominent recent example is Barro (1999).   36
in our view.
29    If our  theoretical  model and  empirical  results  are to be believed, 
geographic and biogeographic variables are certainly invalid instruments for politics and 
institutions because of the remarkably strong direct effects of Geo and Bio Conditions 
on contemporary levels of development registered by our regression results.  Indeed, we 
are tempted to model political-institutional arrangements affecting economic prosperity 
as an intervening variable(s) driven at least to some degree by the same geographic and 
biogeographic  variables that are the  first movers  of  the timing of the  transition to 
agriculture and the onset of sustained  positive growth.    Regressing the  Political 
Environment variable on Geo Conditions and Bio Conditions (with t-ratios and p-values 













  These regressions notwithstanding,  we believe along with many others  that  the 
political-institutional environment has powerful and genuinely independent causal effect 
on economic growth and development.  Yet because of difficult-to-resolve identification 
problems, just how big  an influence politics and institutions  exert  on economic 
performance has not been (and may never be) pinned down with great precision. 
                                                   
29 As an illustration, take  the  Hall and Jones (1999) study which uses latitude, the fraction of the 
population speaking English and the fraction speaking another European language as instruments for 
Social Infrastructure.  However, a high incidence of English and other European languages in current 
periods is strongly associated with non-extractive colonization (what Acemoglu et al., 2000, call the 
creation of “neo Europes”),  which meant  the  wholesale transference of an advanced food and 
technological package from the most advanced societies to the new worlds that most likely still affects 
development.  Latitude is even more difficult to defend as a valid instrument.  The unstable rainfall, 
poor soil quality and prevalence of disease associated with the lower latitudes almost surely depresses 
economic development directly.   37
5.   Concluding Summary 
 
  Archeological and related evidence strongly suggests that the timing and location 
of transitions from hunting and gathering to horticulture and animal husbandry were 
decisively affected by biogeographic endowments of various regions of the world in 
prehistory.    This  historical  observation  is a key feature  of  our  stylized  model of 
economic growth and development.  In our model biogeographic productive 
potentials drive transitions to sedentary agriculture, which in turn make possible the 
formation of non-food sectors  of knowledge  producers whose  activities fuel 
endogenous technological progress and sustained positive growth.  The model implies 
that the earlier the transition from hunter-gatherer to agricultural production, the 
longer the period of endogenous growth of knowledge,  the longer the period of 
positive steady state growth of output,  and the higher the level of economic 
development – even in the present day. 
  The main  implications of our reading of history and of our  theoretical setup 
received quite strong support in the data.  Consistent with the long-run causal scheme 
depicted in Figure 1, we found that measures of exogenous geographic conditions 
explain more than three-quarters of the regional variation in prehistoric biogeography.  
As implied by our  theoretical  model, these  admittedly  rough measurements of 
biogeography  are positively (and perhaps concavely) related to  our  equally  rough 
assessments of the transition dates to sedentary agriculture; our Bio Conditions 
variable accounts for around two-thirds of the regional variation in the estimated dates 
of transition.  
  Our empirical analyses, however, focused principally on contemporary levels of 
economic development.  Our regressions showed that as much as half of the 1997 
international variation in log output per person can be explained by  our  noisy 
measures of exogenous geography and prehistoric biogeography.  We interpreted this 
regression evidence to give remarkably strong support to a central prediction of our 
theoretical model and  the  associated historical analysis:    Current variations in 
economic prosperity still embody the effects of the prehistoric productive potentials 
of various environments.  Moreover, the geographic and biogeographic signals we 
detected in current levels of income per person were robust to controls for political   38
and  institutional  variables  that  are known to  exert powerful, proximate  statistical 
influence on international variations in economic prosperity.   39
Data Appendix 
 
Definitions and Sources of Variables 
 
  Climate  is constructed on the basis of Köppen’s widely used  system of climatic 
classification.
30  The classification schedule is vegetation-based and divides climate into 
five major types which Köppen refers to as A,B,C,D, and E.  Climate A corresponds to 
wet tropical climates, B to dry tropical climates, C and D to temperate, mid-latitude 
climates, and E to tundra and ice.  In constructing our Climate variable we made a 
ranking of climates according to how favorable they are to agriculture.  Countries with 
type B climates have been given a value of 0.  Most of the countries in this category are 
found in the Sahara and on the Arabian peninsula.    The tropical climates in the  B 
category were scored 1.  Precipitation is abundant and biodiversity great, but the heavy 
rainfall typically does not favor annual grasses.  Countries with temperate climates of 
type Cfa, Cwa, and D (humid subtropical and continental) were scored 2.  A particular 
subgroup within the non-tropical climates is the Mediterranean and west coast climates 
(Csa, Csb, Cfb, Cfc) with more or less hot, dry summers and wet winters.  These types 
of climate are found in the western parts of continents; in Europe, North Africa, 
California, Chile, South Africa, and the northwestern parts of Australia.  As discussed 
by Blumler (1992) and Diamond (1997), this type of climate is particularly favorable to 
agriculture based on annual, heavy grasses.  Countries that fall into this category were 
scored 3.  Hence, Climate has four units of variation with a mean value normalized to 0.  
   Latitude is the absolute distance from the equator in latitude degrees.  The data are 
from World Bank (1999). 
  Axis  captures the rate of East-West orientation. The variable was constructed by 
measuring the distance in longitudinal degrees between the eastern and westernmost 
points of each continent and dividing this number by the distance in latitudinal degrees 
between the northernmost and southernmost points.  A value of, for instance, 2 indicates 
that the landmass in question is about two times more East-West oriented than north-
south.    The Eurasian landmass is by far the most East-West oriented of the major 
continents, while South America is the most north-south oriented. 
                                                   
30 The data and the discussion of climate have been derived from Britannica (2000).    40
  Size is  just the size of the landmass to which the country belongs in millions of 
square kilometers.  The variation is enormous ranging from Eurasia’s 44 million square 
kilometers to the tiny Malta and Comoros islands of less than 1000 square kilometers. 
  Geo Conditions is the first principal component of Climate, Latitude, Axis, and Size. 
  Plants is the number of annual or perennial wild grasses known to exist in prehistory 
with a mean kernel weight exceeding 10 milligrams.    These data are from Blumler 
(1992) and are equivalent to the numbers shown and discussed in Table 2.    The 
geographical distribution ranges between 33 species in the Near East, Europe, and North 
Africa - including wild barley, emmer and einkorn wheat – to 0 in the Pacific islands.  
As noted above, we have divided Eurasia into three subcontinents which had different 
and independent experiences of plant and animal domestication.    The Western part 
reaches its limit in the Indus Valley in Pakistan, where the easternmost archeological 
evidence of crops from the Fertile Crescent has been found (Smith, 1998).  Southeast 
Asia includes Indonesia, the Philippines, and Papua-New Guinea.  Also America is split 
up into three zones of independent agricultural origins; Central, North, and South.  
Caribbean islands and islands near Africa are regarded as belonging to the Central 
American and African zones respectively, while the Pacific islands are treated as 
independent of the Asian zone of agricultural origin (and hence have zero species 
suitable for domestication). 
  Animals is the number of domesticable big mammals, weighing more than 45 kilos, 
which are believed to have been present in prehistory in various regions.  The data were 
presented in Table 2.  The 14 animals are the ancient ancestors of sheep, goat, cattle, 
horse, pig, Bakhtrian camel, Arabian camel, llama, yak, bali cattle, reindeer, water 
buffalo, donkey, and the mithan (Diamond, 1997).  Out of these 14, western Eurasia and 
North Africa had access to 9, Eastern Eurasia 7, Southeast Asia 2, Central and North 
America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Australia and the Pacific islands 0 (Nowak, 1991).  On 
average, early hunter-gatherers across the world had access to somewhere between 3-4 
domesticable animals.  
  Bio Conditions is the first principal component of Plants and Animals.    
  Political Environment is from Knack and Keefer’s (1995), who in turn have used 
data from the private risk service International Coutry Risk Guide.  The data exhibit the 
average of coding over 1986-95 of five political-institutional characteristics of each   41
country:  (i) quality of bureaucracy, (ii) rule of law, (iii) government corruption, (iv) risk 
of expropriation and (v) risk of government repudiation of contracts.  
  Social Infrastructure was developed by Hall and Jones (1999) to quantify the wedge 
between social and private returns to productive activity;  it is the average of Knack and 
Keefer’s political codings and Sachs and Warner’s (1995) index of the openness of each 
country to free trade during 1950 to 1994.   
  1997 GDP per capita is expressed in constant US dollars (international prices, base 
year 1985).  The data are from World Bank (1999) and were compiled by William 
Easterly on the basis of Penn World Table 5.6 and other sources. 
  Years since transition to agriculture is the number of years before the present that 
agriculture was adopted in eight world areas of independent agricultural development.  
The only missing region is Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Philippines, Papua-New Guinea) 
where transition data are very uncertain.  The data builds upon Diamond (1997) and 
were partly presented in Table 1.  
 




per capita  Climate  Latitude  Axis  Size 
Geo 
Conditions 
             
Argentina  6489  2  0.4075  0.791  17.814  -0.1083 
Austria  13921  3  0.5359  2.355  44.614  1.7026 
Bangladesh  1779  1  0.2653  2.355  44.614  0.5534 
Belgium  14305  3  0.5649  2.355  44.614  1.7591 
Belize  4191  1  0.1983  1.575  24.23  -0.3216 
Benin  1048  1  0.0707  1  30.365  -0.7545 
Bolivia  1896  1  0.1688  0.791  17.814  -0.8847 
Botswana  2681  0  0.2393  1  30.365  -0.7364 
Brazil  4449  1  0.2173  0.791  17.814  -0.7900 
Bulgaria  4617  3  0.4675  2.355  44.614  1.5691 
Burkina Faso  530  1  0.1339  1  30.365  -0.6313 
Burundi  397  1  0.0374  1  30.365  -0.8195 
Cameroon  965  1  0.1192  1  30.365  -0.6599 
Cape Verde  1169  1  0.1677  1  0.004  -1.0881 
Central African Rep.  528  0  0.0481  1  30.365  -1.1093 
Chad  392  0  0.1153  1  30.365  -0.9783 
Chile  6518  3  0.3728  0.791  17.814  0.1348 
China  2387  2  0.3285  2.355  44.614  0.9872   42
Colombia  3813  1  0.0532  0.791  17.814  -1.1101 
Comoros  434  1  0.1297  1  0.002  -1.1623 
Congo, Republic  1978  1  0.0409  1  30.365  -0.8126 
Costa Rica  3801  1  0.1105  1.575  24.23  -0.4928 
Cote d'Ivoire  1187  1  0.0611  1  30.365  -0.7734 
Czech Republic  3751  3  0.5556  2.355  44.614  1.7409 
Denmark  16178  3  0.6191  2.355  44.614  1.8648 
Dominican Republic  2687  1  0.2062  1  0.076  -1.0117 
Ecuador  2926  1  0.0229  0.791  17.814  -1.1692 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  2106  3  0.3333  1  30.365  0.3791 
El Salvador  2158  1  0.1531  1.575  24.23  -0.4097 
Equatorial Guinea  2301  1  0.0258  1  30.365  -0.8421 
Ethiopia  369  0  0.1001  1  30.365  -1.0080 
Fiji  4143  1  0.1981  1  0.018  -1.0286 
Finland  14028  2  0.6690  2.355  44.614  1.6515 
France  14650  3  0.5429  2.355  44.614  1.7161 
Gambia, The  747  1  0.1473  1  30.365  -0.6051 
Georgia  1246  2  0.4670  2.355  44.614  1.2575 
Ghana  1031  1  0.0744  1  30.365  -0.7474 
Greece  7346  3  0.4229  2.355  44.614  1.4821 
Guatemala  2401  1  0.1625  1.575  24.23  -0.3914 
Guinea  843  1  0.1297  1  30.365  -0.6395 
Guinea-Bissau  689  1  0.1362  1  30.365  -0.6267 
Haiti  621  1  0.2104  1  0.076  -1.0036 
Honduras  1424  1  0.1577  1.575  24.23  -0.4006 
Hong Kong  18811  2  0.2523  2.355  44.614  0.8386 
Hungary  5200  3  0.5269  2.355  44.614  1.6850 
Iceland  14155  2  0.7099  1.667  0.103  0.6182 
India  1624  1  0.2808  2.355  44.614  0.5836 
Indonesia  2735  1  0.0729  3  1.919  -0.2319 
Ireland  13943  3  0.6068  0.75  0.07  0.2650 
Israel  11181  3  0.3565  2.355  44.614  1.3526 
Italy  13357  3  0.5046  2.355  44.614  1.6415 
Jamaica  2326  1  0.2006  1  0.011  -1.0238 
Japan  16003  2  0.3968  1.214  0.377  -0.2162 
Jordan  3098  3  0.3511  2.355  44.614  1.3422 
Kenya  916  1  0.0057  1  30.365  -0.8813 
Korea, Rep.  10131  2  0.4173  2.355  44.614  1.1604 
Lao PDR  1765  1  0.1839  2.355  44.614  0.3944 
Latvia  2691  3  0.6318  2.355  44.614  1.8895 
Lesotho  1331  0  0.3288  1  30.365  -0.5618 
Luxembourg  21974  3  0.5531  2.355  44.614  1.7361 
Madagascar  577  1  0.2106  0.615  0.587  -1.1883   43
Malawi  571  1  0.1757  1  30.365  -0.5498 
Malaysia  7696  1  0.0363  2.355  44.614  0.1067 
Maldives  2424  1  0.1859  1  0.001  -1.0526 
Mali  535  0  0.1390  1  30.365  -0.9321 
Malta  9066  3  0.3987  1  0.001  -0.0160 
Mauritania  922  0  0.1992  1  30.365  -0.8147 
Mauritius  7391  1  0.2248  1  0.002  -0.9767 
Mexico  6435  0  0.1862  1.575  24.23  -0.6558 
Mongolia  1474  0  0.5277  2.355  44.614  0.7544 
Morocco  2231  3  0.3733  1  30.365  0.4570 
Mozambique  914  1  0.2055  1  30.365  -0.4915 
Namibia  2764  0  0.1998  1  30.365  -0.8135 
Nepal  1232  2  0.3079  2.355  44.614  0.9471 
Netherlands  14683  3  0.5764  2.355  44.614  1.7815 
Niger  424  0  0.1542  1  30.365  -0.9025 
Norway  18547  2  0.6664  2.355  44.614  1.6464 
Pakistan  1472  2  0.3464  2.355  44.614  1.0222 
Panama  3612  1  0.1023  1.575  24.23  -0.5088 
Papua New Guinea  1660  1  0.0733  2  0.462  -0.7602 
Paraguay  2240  2  0.2843  0.791  17.814  -0.3487 
Peru  2732  1  0.1310  0.791  17.814  -0.9583 
Philippines  1873  1  0.1547  0.769  0.3  -1.2248 
Poland  5034  3  0.5583  2.355  44.614  1.7462 
Portugal  8684  3  0.4313  2.355  44.614  1.4985 
Romania  1724  2  0.4947  2.355  44.614  1.3116 
Rwanda  579  1  0.0226  1  30.365  -0.8484 
Samoa  2171  1  0.1515  1  0.003  -1.1197 
Senegal  1146  1  0.1641  1  30.365  -0.5723 
Sierra Leone  507  1  0.0967  1  30.365  -0.7039 
Singapore  17559  1  0.0151  2.355  44.614  0.0652 
Slovak Republic  5393  3  0.5333  2.355  44.614  1.6976 
Solomon Islands  2260  1  0.1069  1  0.028  -1.2062 
South Africa  3134  3  0.3237  1  30.365  0.3603 
Spain  10685  3  0.4155  2.355  44.614  1.4678 
Sri Lanka  2734  1  0.0763  1  0.065  -1.2653 
Sudan  1032  0  0.1560  1  24.614  -0.9978 
Swaziland  2664  0  0.2949  1  30.365  -0.6279 
Sweden  14827  2  0.6586  2.355  44.614  1.6313 
Switzerland  15768  3  0.5268  2.355  44.614  1.6847 
Syria  4772  3  0.3718  2.355  44.614  1.3824 
Taiwan  11729  2  0.2667  0.67  0.036  -0.7501 
Tanzania  540  1  0.0239  1  30.365  -0.8458 
Thailand  5038  1  0.1530  2.355  44.614  0.3343   44
Togo  547  1  0.0688  1  30.365  -0.7582 
Tunisia  3465  3  0.4091  1  30.365  0.5269 
Turkey  4396  3  0.4578  2.355  44.614  1.5502 
Uganda  697  1  0.0025  1  30.365  -0.8875 
United Kingdom  14472  3  0.5723  0.5  0.244  0.0747 
Uruguay  5949  2  0.3869  0.791  17.814  -0.1485 
Zambia  649  1  0.1438  1  30.365  -0.6120 
Zimbabwe  1242  0  0.1986  1  30.365  -0.8158 
 
 







           
Argentina  2  1  -0.7689  0.579  0.3341 
Austria  33  9  1.3884  0.949  0.8636 
Bangladesh  6  7  0.1224  0.313  0.1563 
Belgium  33  9  1.3884  0.954  0.8657 
Belize  5  0  -0.7791  #N/A  #N/A 
Benin  4  0  -0.8168  0.376  0.2437 
Bolivia  2  1  -0.7689  0.381  0.5573 
Botswana  4  0  -0.8168  0.713  0.5343 
Brazil  2  1  -0.7689  0.682  0.3853 
Bulgaria  33  9  1.3884  0.706  0.3973 
Burkina Faso  4  0  -0.8168  0.498  0.2492 
Burundi  4  0  -0.8168  0.528  0.2639 
Cameroon  4  0  -0.8168  0.563  0.3593 
Cape Verde  4  0  -0.8168  0.387  0.2291 
Central African 
Rep.  4  0  -0.8168  0.42  0.2099 
Chad  4  0  -0.8168  0.554  0.2770 
Chile  2  1  -0.7689  0.646  0.5343 
China  6  7  0.1224  0.641  0.3203 
Colombia  2  1  -0.7689  0.565  0.3268 
Comoros  4  0  -0.8168  0.567  0.5084 
Congo, Republic  4  0  -0.8168  0.415  0.2073 
Costa Rica  5  0  -0.7791  0.67  0.5461 
Cote d'Ivoire  4  0  -0.8168  0.626  0.3128 
Czech Republic  33  9  1.3884  #N/A  #N/A 
Denmark  33  9  1.3884  0.984  0.8809 
Dominican 
Republic  5  0  -0.7791  0.51  0.2548 
Ecuador  2  1  -0.7689  0.573  0.7089 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  33  9  1.3884  0.551  0.2755 
El Salvador  5  0  -0.7791  0.372  0.3858   45
Equatorial Guinea  4  0  -0.8168  #N/A  #N/A 
Ethiopia  4  0  -0.8168  0.399  0.1993 
Fiji  0  0  -0.9678  0.611  0.5098 
Finland  33  9  1.3884  0.98  0.8789 
France  33  9  1.3884  0.941  0.8707 
Gambia, The  4  0  -0.8168  0.568  0.3949 
Georgia  33  9  1.3884  #N/A  #N/A 
Ghana  4  0  -0.8168  0.54  0.3813 
Greece  33  9  1.3884  0.712  0.7560 
Guatemala  5  0  -0.7791  0.371  0.3968 
Guinea  4  0  -0.8168  0.504  0.3518 
Guinea-Bissau  4  0  -0.8168  0.34  0.2587 
Haiti  5  0  -0.7791  0.236  0.1178 
Honduras  5  0  -0.7791  0.424  0.3896 
Hong Kong  6  7  0.1224  0.791  0.8957 
Hungary  33  9  1.3884  0.788  0.4496 
Iceland  0  0  -0.9678  0.986  0.8957 
India  6  7  0.1224  0.591  0.3064 
Indonesia  6  2  -0.4946  0.484  0.5196 
Ireland  33  9  1.3884  0.889  0.7667 
Israel  33  9  1.3884  0.756  0.4891 
Italy  33  9  1.3884  0.815  0.8077 
Jamaica  5  0  -0.7791  0.544  0.4831 
Japan  6  7  0.1224  0.932  0.8327 
Jordan  33  9  1.3884  0.562  0.6145 
Kenya  4  0  -0.8168  0.582  0.3131 
Korea, Rep.  6  7  0.1224  0.735  0.6673 
Lao PDR  6  7  0.1224  0.574  #N/A 
Latvia  33  9  1.3884  #N/A  #N/A 
Lesotho  4  0  -0.8168  0.661  0.5515 
Luxembourg  33  9  1.3884  1  0.9000 
Madagascar  4  0  -0.8168  0.476  0.2380 
Malawi  4  0  -0.8168  0.503  0.2513 
Malaysia  6  7  0.1224  0.687  0.8437 
Maldives  6  7  0.1224  #N/A  #N/A 
Mali  4  0  -0.8168  0.311  0.2333 
Malta  33  9  1.3884  0.622  0.5786 
Mauritania  4  0  -0.8168  0.406  0.2031 
Mauritius  4  0  -0.8168  0.704  0.8519 
Mexico  5  0  -0.7791  0.592  0.3962 
Mongolia  6  7  0.1224  0.582  #N/A 
Morocco  33  9  1.3884  0.563  0.5037 
Mozambique  4  0  -0.8168  0.536  0.2680   46
Namibia  4  0  -0.8168  0.462  0.3685 
Nepal  6  7  0.1224  #N/A  #N/A 
Netherlands  33  9  1.3884  0.988  0.8940 
Niger  4  0  -0.8168  0.514  0.2570 
Norway  33  9  1.3884  0.968  0.8727 
Pakistan  33  9  1.3884  0.453  0.2265 
Panama  5  0  -0.7791  0.41  0.3345 
Papua New Guinea 6  2  -0.4946  0.625  0.3123 
Paraguay  2  1  -0.7689  0.486  0.3097 
Peru  2  1  -0.7689  0.438  0.4636 
Philippines  6  2  -0.4946  0.407  0.2811 
Poland  33  9  1.3884  0.694  0.4024 
Portugal  33  9  1.3884  0.811  0.7946 
Romania  33  9  1.3884  0.516  0.2912 
Rwanda  4  0  -0.8168  0.387  0.1934 
Samoa  0  0  -0.9678  #N/A  #N/A 
Senegal  4  0  -0.8168  0.487  0.2433 
Sierra Leone  4  0  -0.8168  0.398  0.1990 
Singapore  6  7  0.1224  0.859  0.9297 
Slovak Republic  33  9  1.3884  #N/A  #N/A 
Solomon Islands  0  0  -0.9678  #N/A  #N/A 
South Africa  4  0  -0.8168  0.74  0.4143 
Spain  33  9  1.3884  0.802  0.7901 
Sri Lanka  6  7  0.1224  0.463  0.4315 
Sudan  4  0  -0.8168  0.308  0.1671 
Swaziland  4  0  -0.8168  0.602  0.5312 
Sweden  33  9  1.3884  0.987  0.8824 
Switzerland  33  9  1.3884  1  1.0000 
Syria  33  9  1.3884  0.491  0.4123 
Taiwan  6  7  0.1224  0.823  0.7669 
Tanzania  4  0  -0.8168  0.551  0.2757 
Thailand  6  7  0.1224  0.711  0.8555 
Togo  4  0  -0.8168  0.446  0.2228 
Tunisia  33  9  1.3884  0.541  0.3373 
Turkey  33  9  1.3884  0.601  0.3673 
Uganda  4  0  -0.8168  0.368  0.2618 
United Kingdom  33  9  1.3884  0.933  0.8556 
Uruguay  2  1  -0.7689  0.564  0.3374 
Zambia  4  0  -0.8168  0.424  0.2342 
Zimbabwe  4  0  -0.8168  0.545  0.2725 
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